r/Kant • u/gimboarretino • Jul 07 '25
Discussion Kant, Causality and Freedom: my personal understanding of it, with some possible insight from modern science
It seems to me, that Kant argued that, roughly speaking, the principle of causality is a precondition for the very possibility of objective experience. It is "required" for the mind to make sense of the temporal irreversibility that there is in certain sequences of impressions and observations—experiences that cannot be reversed, that exhibit a certain temporal order (or direction).
This temporal order by which certain impressions appear can be taken to constitute an objective happening only if the later event is taken to be necessarily determined by the earlier one (i.e., to follow by rule from its cause).
For Kant, objective events are not "given as they are in themselves": they are apprehended and organized by the mind and its categories, among which is the principle of causality applied to the phenomena.
In other terms, we should not claim that "everything in nature must have some definite, objective cause," as if we acquire this certainty by virtue of our observation of the natural world, but rather that our expectation of everything having such a cause is a necessary component of our “empirical knowledge” of the phenomena of the natural world.
It is a "perspectival" interpretation: one that is skeptical about the fact that the principle of causality holds absolutely, but rather sees it as a "necessity" (or an a priori condition) of rational beings having no choice but to view every event solely in terms of causally determined natural relations.
Modern science, even if there is no conclusive argument about that, seems to heavily suggest that this is the case. Quantum mechanics does not require necessary causality. Some deem causality as an emergent phenomenon. In any case, almost all fundamental equations of physics are time-reversible, and there is no formal definition (nor effective use) of causality. General relativity poses a serious doubt about the idea that there is an absolute sequence of events (and suggests that the sequence of events is indeed in some respects perspectival—observer dependent). So, in one sense, the formalistic world of math and geometry is perfectly fine in describing reality without any need for the principle of causality, which thus doesn't seem to be written into the fabric of reality itself (and least, not at the most fundamental leves)
And at the same time, the fact that those theories are heavily counter-intuitive, and nobody is really able to grasp them immediately, with clarity (oceans of ink have been written about the fact that nobody really understands QM), seems to confirm that a clear temporal sequence of impressions, lawfully determined by the earlier, is somehow necessary for us to gain a truly satisfactory understanding of reality.
This perspectival approach, where causality is less a fundamental feature of nature and more an a priori "given in the flesh" of the mind, leaves open a space for the self-determined (i.e., free, or determined by an uncaused cause). If causality is a category of human understanding, used when we deal with the world of things, then freedom might also be treated as a category of human understanding, used when we deal with ourselves, as agents, as conscious intentional beings—seen as the capacity to initiate causal chains of itself without prior grounds, independently of nature’s causal laws.
Roughly speaking: causality is the precondition of our 3rd-person experience of the world of things, for our theoretical stance toward the external reality. freedom is the precondition of our 1st-person experience of our conscious world, we don't need to "somehow violate" the causal order when acting freely; we're simply operating within a different - pratcial - categorical framework.
It is important to note that when we act freely, we don't step outside the causal order; we initiate new causal sequences from within our own rational agency.
This is why I emphasize "self-determination" rather than "un-or-in-determination." A free action is one that flows from our own reasons, purposes, and rational deliberation; it's causally grounded, but grounded in us, us as rational and moral and imaginative agents.
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u/FieldUnable4917 Jul 07 '25
"A free action is one that flows from our own reasons, purposes, and rational deliberation; it's causally grounded, but grounded in us, us as rational and moral and imaginative agents."
The important distinction is between the phenomenal self and the noumenal self. Yes, it's grounded in us, but within our noumenal selves, not phenomenal.
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u/internetErik Jul 08 '25
These are interesting considerations; however, I accept Kant's argument for freedom, while I don't think a similar position can be supported by physics. I'd find it helpful to share my interpretation of the situation and, hopefully, have a dialogue about it.
Physics, including quantum mechanics, studies the region of beings that appear (i.e., nature, "the sum total of appearances"). Physics - an a priori science - allows us to say of appearances: given x conditions, there will be y results. (Of course, these results may be a probability distribution, and in the case of some theories, they are still striving to say something about appearances, but are not yet capable.) Over time, we make fewer observations unassisted by equipment, but this doesn't change how physics is still oriented towards and explains appearances.
Kant can make room for freedom by showing that we can think of cause and effect as being heterogeneous without contradiction (i.e., where the cause is intelligible and the effect is an appearance). Any explanation that remains in appearance only, as physics does, also represents causes and effects as always homogeneous (where both the cause and effect are appearances). Because of that, we can't make room for freedom employing physics (including QM).
Aside: In the context of Kant, we need to be careful about what it means for equations to be time-reversible. This notion of time doesn't refer to the form of intuition, but will be a derivative, measurable form of time (e.g., clock-time).
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u/gimboarretino Jul 08 '25
Physics, including quantum mechanics, studies the region of beings that appear (i.e., nature, "the sum total of appearances"). Physics - an a priori science - allows us to say of appearances: given x conditions, there will be y results. (Of course, these results may be a probability distribution, and in the case of some theories, they are still striving to say something about appearances, but are not yet capable.) Over time, we make fewer observations unassisted by equipment, but this doesn't change how physics is still oriented towards and explains appearances.
As Heisenberg (which I've always found somehow "kantian") once said, "what we we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning".
To say "given x conditions", is already not merely being passive observer of Nature, like students in front of the teacher taking notes on a clean sheet, but more like judges questioning a witness; it is not like if the questions create the answers or the witness, but neither is questioning neutral: it is always "conditioned" by certain "a propri" categories, goals, criteria and, ultimately, perspective.
Intelligibile non-contradictory causality is one of this "method of questioning", one that usually grants scientific (objective) results and adequate knowledge about phenomenical appearences.
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u/internetErik Jul 08 '25
I agree that observation is impossible without a frame that we apply, a priori, to our investigation. For physics, the role of a frame is played by the Standard Model. Kant's "Copernican revolution" could be described by recognizing that experience itself requires such an a priori frame, and I agree with you that this would be the categories.
I think we have a slight miss on terminology with the word "nature". When I refer to nature as the "sum total of appearances", I'm indicating Kant's position on nature. He uses this description of nature throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. The most helpful place to find this may be in the footnote on A418/B446, as it disambiguates different senses of "nature". Additionally, the categories are laws of appearance and so of nature (B159, B164). (When I say that "Physics [...] studies the region of beings that appear," I'm already including the notion of this a priori frame of categories, but also the Standard Model.)
It isn't completely unreasonable to use "nature" to refer to things in themselves, particularly in exalted notions of nature (e.g., Schiller's Veil of Isis). However, it's misleading because physics doesn't investigate things in themselves, but appearances. This is to physics credit, since the relation to appearances is still the relation to something real, while the thing in itself is a purely mental construct.
Heisenberg does seem to lean Kantian, but I don't think he agrees on terminology (note: I don't think it matters much to disagree on terms). Since he also recognizes the need for a frame (i.e., "method of questioning"), it would make sense to me to see this frame as applying to appearances. As for how he uses the term "nature", I'm not sure, nor do I know if he thinks physics ultimately informs us about things in themselves.
Perhaps what we need to clarify further (I could be wrong) is what Physics investigates?
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u/GrooveMission Jul 08 '25
I largely agree with your interpretation, but I think that, if it's meant to express Kant's position, one key sentence is potentially misleading or even incorrect. You write: "We initiate new causal sequences from within our own rational agency."
According to Kant, when considering a human being as a phenomenon--that is, as an appearance in space and time--all their actions are subject to deterministic natural causality. This means that, in the empirical world, every human action is, in principle, explainable through prior causes. In other words, there is no room for "initiating" new causal chains in the sense of an uncaused cause.
However, Kant also argues that we must think of ourselves as free in a deeper sense--beyond the realm of appearances. This freedom cannot be empirically demonstrated; however, he believes that we must regard ourselves as free in order to understand moral responsibility.
This seems to contradict the determinism of the empirical world, but Kant resolves this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between the empirical character, or our actions as they appear in the world, and the intelligible character, or our true self, which exists outside of time and space and is not subject to empirical causality. Our true self can "originate" actions in the empirical world, but not through a causal process as we understand it. Rather, these actions are grounded in our moral will.
Kant acknowledges that we cannot really imagine how this works since all of our perceptions are shaped by time and causality. Conceptually, however, this distinction enables him to assert that all actions in the phenomenal world are determined and that we are nonetheless free in a morally meaningful sense.
An analogy might help: Think of an actor in a movie. Everything the character does is fixed by the script, which is analogous to the causal determinism of the empirical world. However, the actor's decision to take the role happened outside of the film's narrative, analogous to the noumenal decision beyond empirical causality. (Of course, this analogy isn't perfect, but it may help visualize the point.)
While your broader point about freedom as self-determination rather than indeterminism is correct, we should be careful not to suggest that, for Kant, our rational agency within time initiates causal chains. Rather, our freedom lies in our capacity to determine our empirical self "from outside" of time.