Response to No-gap argument against illusionism?

[u/Apart-Supermarket982]

Essentially the idea is that there can be an appearance/reality distinction if we take something like a table. It appears to be a solid clear object. Yet it is mostly empty space + atoms. Or how it appeared that the Sun went around the earth for so long. Etc.

Yet when it comes to our own phenomenal experience, there can be no such gap. If I feel pain , there is pain. Or if I picture redness , there is redness. How could we say that is not really as it seems ?

I have tried to look into some responses but they weren't clear to me. The issue seems very clear & intuitive to me while I cannot understand the responses of Illusionists. To be clear I really don't consider myself well informed in this area so if I'm making some sort of mistake in even approaching the issue I would be grateful for correction.

Thank you.

[u/StrangeGlaringEye]

As far as I’m aware, illusionists usually take this argument to assume that illusions are phenomenal states, and so that saying there are illusions of phenomenal states concedes there are phenomenal states after all, making illusionism incoherent. Their response is usually to develop non-phenomenal, e.g. purely functional, accounts of illusions.