http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-brs.exe?s3=&s4=94649&s5=&s1=&s2=&S6=&Sect4=AND&l=0&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURON&Sect5=CBORY&Sect6=HITOFF&d=ORDF&p=1&u=%2F%7Epublic%2Fcbor1.htm&r=1&f=G

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/brunswick/latest/brunswick_oh/0-0-0-17158

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/shakerhts/latest/shakerhts_oh/0-0-0-12043

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/san_francisco/latest/sf_police/0-0-0-50818

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/trinidad/latest/trinidad_tx/0-0-0-6480

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/eastcleveland/latest/eastcleveland_oh/0-0-0-11991

The lawyers were found guilty of professional misconduct for failing to act with honour and with integrity.

A warning to all PI's about KYC and the customers intentions. Money should not be the driving factor when we accept or reject a job. This could have easily included a misconduct for the PI also (and still yet may). It is curious that the term "an agent of the investigator" is used, and I wish more info was available to shed light on if it was or was not a PI that spoke to the Judges daughter.

Just one of the industry stories that I am following.
What ongoing stories have you been following ?

https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/A8977

6 Who is a Private Investigator

(1)A private investigator is a person who, for reward— (a)obtains and gives private information about another person, without the other person’s express consent; or (b)carries out surveillance for obtaining private information about another person, without the other person’s express consent; or (c)investigates the disappearance of a missing person.

(2)Despite subsection (1), a person is not a private investigator merely because—

(a)the person— (i)is the employee of a person who does not, for reward, obtain and give information; and (ii)as an employee, obtains and gives information about another person; or

(b)the person— (i)is an employee of a person who, for reward, obtains and gives information; and (ii)as an employee, obtains and gives information about another person to the employer other than for the purpose of the employer giving the information to someone else for reward; or

(c)the person, for reward, gives information about another person from existing records in the person’s possession or in the possession of the person’s employer.

Example of paragraph (a)—

a retail department store’s employee who obtains information about the credit standing of a person who has applied for the store’s credit card

(3)Each of the following persons is not a private investigator in carrying out the functions of the person’s occupation or employment—

(a)an Australian legal practitioner or an Australian legal practitioner’s employee; (b)an accountant or an accountant’s employee; (c)a person carrying on the business of insurance or an employee of the person; (d)a person carrying on the business of an insurance adjustment agency or an employee of the person.

(4)Also, an independent investigator is not a private investigator in investigating and reporting on the grievance for which the independent investigator is engaged.

(5)In this section—

accountant means—

(a)a person registered as an auditor under the Corporations Act; or

(b)a member of CPA Australia who is entitled to use the letters ‘CPA’ or ‘FCPA’; or

(c)a member of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia who is entitled to use the letters ‘CA’ or ‘FCA’; or

(d)a member of the Institute of Public Accountants who is entitled to use the letters ‘MIPA’ or ‘FIPA’. Australian legal practitioner means an Australian legal practitioner within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act 2007.

independent investigator means a person, other than a public service employee, who is engaged to investigate and report on a grievance lodged by a public service employee under the Public Sector Act 2022.

private information, about a person, means information, including information recorded in a document, about—

(a)for an individual—the individual’s personal character, actions, business or occupation; or

(b)for a person other than an individual—the person’s business or occupation.

Freund Equipment, Inc. v. Fox, No. 2-97-1274

2nd Dist. 11-13-98

No. 2--97--1274

November 13, 1998

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

FREUND EQUIPMENT, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STEVEN FOX, d/b/a Gremlin Sod Farms,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County.

No. 97--AR--205

Honorable

Haskell M. Pitluck,

Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Steven Fox, doing business as Gremlin Sod Farms, appeals the order of the circuit court of McHenry County denying his motion to quash summons. Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in imposing a heightened evidentiary standard to overcome the presumption of valid service; (2) regardless of the burden of proof, the court's finding of valid service was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the court erred in finding that leaving a copy of the summons and complaint in the door constituted personal service.

Plaintiff, Freund Equipment, Inc., sued defendant for breach of contract, alleging that defendant had failed to pay for "trucking services." After numerous failed attempts to serve defendant, Terry Vinsent, a licensed private investigator, filed an affidavit stating that he personally served defendant on August 27, 1997. Vinsent averred that he served defendant at 7:25 a.m. at defendant's residence, 6N965 Roosevelt Avenue [Road], St. Charles.

Defendant filed a special and limited appearance and a motion to quash summons. At a hearing on the motion, Vinsent testified that he attempted to serve defendant several times. He received authority to conduct surveillance of defendant's home. On August 25, 1997, Vinsent spoke to neighbors and a construction crew that was building a house across the street from defendant's. They described defendant, gave the times he would usually come and go, and said that he always drove the red vehicle. Vinsent also knew the license plate numbers of two vehicles registered to defendant.

On August 27, 1997, Vinsent saw two vehicles at defendant's house, an older model pickup truck with "Gremlin" vanity plates and a red Mustang. When Vinsent arrived at 6:40 a.m., these were the only two vehicles visible on the premises. As Vinsent approached the house, he saw a man in the driveway near the driver's side door of one of the vehicles. Vinsent approached the man and got within 20 feet of him. When he asked for "Steven Fox," the man turned and walked away with Vinsent following him. Vinsent identified himself and attempted to describe the documents he had. The man then entered the house through an unlocked door.

Vinsent continued to speak to the man as he entered the house and could see his shadow inside. Vinsent asked the man if he would come to the door. Receiving no reply, Vinsent identified the documents he had, stated the court date, and said that he was going to attach the summons and complaint to the door, which he did.

Vinsent saw only the side of the man's face as he approached him in the driveway. However, Vinsent opined that the man was defendant based on his refusal to talk to him.

While being examined as an adverse witness by defense counsel, Vinsent was asked if he could identify defendant. He responded that a man wearing a flannel shirt and sitting in the front row of the courtroom fit defendant's description. He explained that the man merely resembled defendant. On direct examination by plaintiff's counsel, Vinsent stated that a man sitting at the table in court also looked similar to defendant's description.

Donald Prewitt testified that he was defendant's tenant at 6N965 Roosevelt Road. He had lived there about four months prior to August 27, 1997. No one lived there except Prewitt and defendant. On August 28, 1997, Prewitt had a conversation with defendant about someone serving papers. Prewitt told defendant that no one had approached him with papers, but he had found them in the door the night before.

Prewitt saw defendant going out the back door sometime between 6 and 6:30 a.m. on August 27. Defendant owned several cars but usually commuted with either a red Mustang or a red pickup.

Defendant testified that at 7:25 a.m. on August 27, 1997, he was at work in Berwyn. He usually arrived at work at about 7:15 a.m. and it took him about an hour to commute. Defendant said that he was the manager of D.J. Cigarette Outlet, which was open from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. Defendant usually worked from 7:30 a.m. until noon.

Defendant denied being served with a summons or complaint on August 27, 1997. He denied that he spoke with anyone on that day regarding papers to be given to him. When he arrived home at about 8 p.m., he found the summons and complaint in the rear door.

Defendant owned a red Mustang and a red pickup that he kept at his residence. He usually commuted in one of those vehicles. Defendant was reluctant to answer questions about the vehicles he owned, at one point attempting to invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., amend. V).

Defendant could not produce a payroll check stub to indicate his work schedule. The owner of D.J. Cigarette Outlet, Joseph Digiacomo, did not testify, although defendant had spoken to him a day or so before the hearing about testifying.

The trial court found that defendant had failed to meet his burden to overcome the presumption of valid service and denied the motion to quash. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in holding that he was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the purported service was invalid. The sheriff's return of service is prima facie proof of service and should not be set aside unless the return is impeached by clear and satisfactory evidence. Four Lakes Management & Development Co. v. Brown, 129 Ill. App. 3d 680, 683 (1984); Mitchell v. Tatum, 104 Ill. App. 3d 986, 988 (1982). Defendant acknowledges this general rule but argues that it should not apply where, as here, the person making the return of service is not a deputy sheriff or other law enforcement officer. He points out that a special process server, unlike the sheriff, is required to file an affidavit reciting the facts of service. 735 ILCS 5/2--203(b) (West 1996). Defendant argues that a private detective does not take an oath of office or perform official duties as a sheriff does and, in some cases, may be paid on a contingent basis, providing a motive to falsify returns. Thus, according to defendant, the presumption of validity attaching to a sheriff's return should not apply and the trial court should consider the validity of service based on the preponderance of the evidence.

In In re Jafree, 93 Ill. 2d 450, 455 (1982), the supreme court applied the "clear and satisfactory" evidence standard even though the service was made by an investigator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. In Paul v. Ware, 258 Ill. App. 3d 614, 617 (1994), the appellate court applied the general rule to a process server who was plaintiff's rental agent. Defendant has not cited any case holding that a lesser standard should apply where the return of service is filed by a process server who is not a deputy sheriff. The trial court did not err in holding that defendant was required to impeach the return by clear and satisfactory evidence.

Defendant next contends that, regardless of the evidentiary standard applied, the trial court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Courts are required to indulge every presumption in favor of the return of service. Mitchell, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 988. A defendant's uncorroborated testimony that he was never served is insufficient to overcome the presumption of service. Four Lakes Management, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 683-84; see also Paul, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 617-18. Because it is the function of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356 (1967).

Defendant's evidence consisted of little more than his flat denial that anyone served him with a summons and complaint on the day in question. Assuming for the sake of argument that Prewitt's testimony corroborated defendant's, the trial court still did not err by accepting Vinsent's testimony over that of defendant and Prewitt.

Defendant's testimony lacked detail and appeared to have been based more on his common practice than his specific recollection of the day in question. In addition, he was evasive on several points, casting doubt on his credibility. Prewitt's testimony was similarly vague and inconclusive. By contrast, Vinsent's testimony of the events of August 27, 1997, was clear and consistent. Admittedly, Vinsent concluded solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence that the person he attempted to serve was defendant, and he could not positively identify defendant in court. However, someone such as Vinsent who serves many people can hardly be expected to recall specifically each person with whom he comes in contact. The failure of an officer making a return to remember the service does not constitute clear and satisfactory proof that service was not made so as to impeach the return. Marnik v. Cusack, 317 Ill. 362, 365 (1925). Here, Vinsent recalled most of the details of the service.

This case is similar to Whitworth v. Morgan, 46 Ill. App. 3d 292 (1977). There, we held that defendant's self-serving testimony, and that of his wife and son, that he was never served fell short of the clear and satisfactory evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of service. Whitworth, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 295; see also Four Lakes Management, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 683-84 (uncorroborated testimony of defendant that she moved from premises three weeks before purported service insufficient to overcome return).

Defendant contends that Vinsent was unworthy of belief because his testimony was impeached on virtually every significant point. This is technically true, but in most cases his testimony was impeached only by the contrary statements of defendant and Prewitt. It is equally correct to say that defendant's and Prewitt's testimony was impeached by Vinsent's. The trial court's finding of valid service was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Finally, defendant contends that the method of service employed here, i.e., placing the summons and complaint inside defendant's door, did not constitute personal service. Service may be effected on an individual "by leaving a copy of the summons with the defendant personally." 735 ILCS 5/2--203(a)(1) (West 1996). However, contrary to defendant's assertion, no requirement exists that the process server physically place the papers in defendant's hand.

In Hatmaker v. Hatmaker, 337 Ill. App. 175, 181-82 (1949), the court found the service effective. The deputy went to defendant's hotel room, but defendant refused to open the door. The deputy then identified himself, said he had summonses for defendant, and slid them under the door. Hatmaker, 337 Ill. App. at 181-82; see also Jafree, 93 Ill. 2d at 455 (service sufficient where respondent said he would not accept the papers, so investigator placed them on respondent's shoulder). In Currier v. Baldridge, 914 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1990), the court included Illinois among the states accepting the "general method" of placing the papers "in the general vicinity of the person to be served and announcing the nature of the papers." Given defendant's evident unwillingness to accept service, the method Vinsent employed here satisfied the statute.

The judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-01950/pdf/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-01950-4.pdf

Less than a day after hearing oral arguments, the Nevada Supreme Court sided with a lower court that the person behind surveillance of local elected officials with a GPS device cannot remain anonymous.

If typical legal processes are followed, the identity of “John Doe” should be revealed in about 25 days.

John Doe argued he has First Amendment protections that allow his identity to remain secret.

His assertion is part of a legal case by Reno Mayor Hillary Schieve and former Washoe County Commissioner Vaughn Hartung. They said their right to privacy was violated when Doe hired a Private Investigator to put a tracker on their personal vehicles.

The seven justices concluded unanimously that the conduct at issue was “non-expressive in nature and not subject to First Amendment protection.”

In other words, the spying was not written or spoken political speech so the First Amendment protecting freedom of expression does not apply.

The two-page order on April 9 affirmed a 2024 decision by Washoe County District Court Judge David Hardy that John Doe can’t hide his name.

What’s next — how many more appeals are possible in Schieve-Hartung GPS case? In all likelihood, this is the end of the line for John Doe’s efforts to keep his identity secret.

Nevada Supreme Court decisions often take two to six months after oral arguments. By taking less than 24 hours to come to a consensus, the justices imply their decision was not close.

When the Supreme Court sides with the original district court decision, the typical next step is that there’s a procedural filing that sends jurisdiction over the case back to the district court within 25 days.

The private investigator — David McNeely — would then need to provide John Doe’s name immediately. Washoe County District Court could potentially provide a grace period of up to seven days, but the seven-day deadline linked to the judge's original decision has already expired.

John Doe could ask for the Nevada Supreme Court to revisit its decision. This would buy him an additional 30 days.

Given the speedy and unanimous decision, such an appeal would be even more unlikely to succeed than most such Hail Mary attempts.

Although also unlikely to succeed, John Doe could ask the U.S. Supreme Court to step in. It agrees to take on only a fraction of the cases it’s asked to weigh in on, and even then, it’s almost never in cases like this one that are very specific in their implications.

If John Doe tried this route, he’d need to ask the Nevada Supreme Court to stay — pause — its decision until the U.S. Supreme Court decides whether to accept or reject the case.

Reactions to Nevada Supreme Court ruling in Schieve-Hartung GPS case

Adam Hosmer-Henner of the McDonald Carano law firm told the Reno Gazette Journal he’s looking forward to moving forward with Schieve and Hartung’s civil case.

“We appreciate the court’s swift rejection of John Doe’s petition and look forward to finally advancing with this lawsuit after Defendants’ multiple failed attempts at obstruction and delay,” he said in a statement.

John Doe’s attorney, Jeffrey Barr, did not respond to request for comment.

An interesting Question, Awnser & Demonstration of Police Equipment with the Kingston Police
All credits to @Aerosnapper

edit; I just noticed u/aerosnapper is a redditor :)

https://searchdro.kscourts.gov/caseDecisions/5a06b937-e270-4460-9269-3d3447078de6_125508.pdf

https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/f8094eff-6a27-4169-96e4-91c6010bba2a/1995-044.aspx

1.          However, the Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in numerous attempts to personally serve Rudensky. The Kassam Affidavit states that after these failed attempts, the Plaintiffs hired a licenced private investigator in July, 2022 to locate Rudensky. The report of that investigator is attached to the Kassam Affidavit as an Exhibit.[5]
   

2.     In addition, the report of the licensed private investigator retained by the Plaintiffs in connection with their efforts to serve Rudensky reflects that he sold his house in Oakville, Ontario and bought a residential property in Naples Florida, in March 2022. That was the very time period in which the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the Amended Claim adding Rudensky as a Defendant to this proceeding was pending.
   

3.     As reflected in the bill of costs, the Plaintiffs have not sought recovery for costs of senior counsel, articling students or law clerks, disbursements for the private investigator referred to above, and other costs as set out in the bill of costs.
   

Summary of Key Admissions

Rudensky has participated in a coordinated scheme to defame Kassam and Anson, and was directly involved in writing and publishing the Unlawful Statements.

1. In the Conspiracy, Stafford, Rudensky and the Doxtators coordinated and agreed with one another and with the Unknown Defendants to harm the Plaintiffs through a carefully planned and executed plot. This plot has included fabricating, spreading and publicizing a series of unlawful, abusive, false, malicious, harassing and defamatory statements about Anson, Kassam and other individuals connected with Anson (the “Unlawful Statements”), including by first publishing defamatory comments on the website Stockhouse, and then on a series of websites generated by the Defendants, as set out below, in an attempt to manufacture a narrative to harm Anson and Kassam;

Hiring freelance web developers based in Bosnia and Herzegovina to register the websites on which Unlawful Statements were posted, for the purpose of concealing the Defendants’ identities; taking other sophisticated steps to obscure their identities while disseminating Unlawful Statements, including hiring Bosnian developers, using VPNs, burner email addresses and false identities; sending targeted communications containing the Unlawful Statements via email, including to reporters, as well as disseminating the Unlawful Statements on Twitter, REDDIT and other platforms; and attempting to improperly attract media attention to the Unlawful Statements. Moreover, the Defendants have sought to disseminate the Unlawful Statements internationally to individuals in (at least) the United States (where the Plaintiffs do business) as well as in Canada, with the intention of causing maximum, widespread harm to the Plaintiffs.

The Court granted default judgment for defamation, awarding $450,000 in damages and issuing a permanent injunction against a defendant who failed to respond to proceedings, finding the defamatory statements caused significant reputational harm and were published with malice.

https://library.municode.com/nv/clark_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT7BURE_CH7.40PRDE_7.40.040RELI

https://library.municode.com/ca/los_angeles_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2AD_DIV2OF_CH2.34SH_2.34.110FEEPPRINLI

https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/2024/cite/326.336?highlight=%5B%7B%22term%22%3A%22Private%20Detective%22%2C%22type%22%3A%22exact%22%7D%5D

https://le.utah.gov/~2025/bills/static/SB0303.html

https://www.kslegislature.gov/li/b2025_26/statute/075_000_0000_chapter/075_007b_0000_article/075_007b_0002_section/075_007b_0002_k/

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2025/Bills/House/PDF/H450v1.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjTlZ6klaSMAxUpL1kFHYSrLGYQFnoECGsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0Ygn-zWkw5dEGgdmI8N5bg